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POLICY-INDUCED TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION:
EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. LEAD PHASEDOWN
Suzi Kerrw
RichardG. Newellz
Theory suggests that economic instruments, such as pollution taxes or
tradable permits, can provide more efficient technology adoption
incentives than conventional regulatory standards.We explore this issue
for an important industry undergoing dramatic decreases in allowed
pollution – theU.S. petroleum industry’s phasedownof lead in gasoline.
Using a durationmodel applied to a panel of refineries from 1971–1995,
we find that the pattern of technology adoption is consistent with an
economic response to market incentives, plant characteristics, and
alternative policies. Importantly, evidence suggests that the tradable
permit system used during the phasedown provided incentives for more
efficient technology adoption decisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic and policy discussions have become increasingly permeated by
issues related to technological change, particularly in the environmental
arena. Policy interventions create constraints and incentives that influence
the process of technological change, and these induced effects of policy on
technology may have substantial implications for positive analysis of the
impact of alternative policies, as well as the normative analysis of policy
decisions. The theoretical literature has long recognized that alternative
types of policy instruments can have significantly different effects on the rate
and direction of technological change, typically finding that economic
incentive – based instruments (e.g., pollution taxes and tradable pollution
permits) can provide more efficient incentives for technology adoption than
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conventional regulations (e.g., technology and performance standards).1
Despite a reasonable amount of theoretical attention, little empirical
evidence exists on the dynamic effects of environmental regulation,
particularly with respect to the relative effects of alternative policy
instruments.2 We provide some of the first such evidence.
This paper reports a detailed empirical study of these issues for an
important industry undergoing technological responses to a dramatic
decrease in allowed pollution levels. While many are familiar with the
success of the tradable permit system for sulfur dioxide [Joskow,
Schmalensee, and Bailey 1998], the phasedown of lead in gasoline by U.S.
petroleum refineries during the 1970s and 1980swas the firstmajor success in
implementing a market-based environmental policy. Historically, lead was
added to gasoline to inexpensively boost octane levels, but it also has serious
side effects on human health. We assess the pattern of technology adoption
by refineries during the lead phasedown, both across refineries and across
time, with the intent of understanding how various economic incentives,
market factors, and the stringency and form of regulation influenced this
process.
Toward this end, we develop amodel of the technology adoption decision
in the presence of regulation andderive an econometrically testable duration
model. Our econometric approach is related to that taken by several applied
industrial organization studies of technology adoption3, although those
studies do not assess the influence of regulation on the process of
technological change. The model suggests that firms will gradually adopt
the technology as its costs fall and increased regulatory stringency increases
the value of adoption; firms with lower benefits or higher costs will adopt
more slowly. We also test the proposition that there will be a divergence in
the adoption propensities of low versus high compliance cost plants during
periods with a tradable permit system versus an individually binding
1 Jaffe et al. [2003] provide a broad review of the literature on technological change and the
environment. Zerbe [1970], Orr [1976], andMagat [1978] provide early theoretical discussions
of the firm’s incentives to innovate and adopt pollution-reducing technology. More recently,
Downing and White [1986] look at firms’ incentives, Malueg [1989] compares the differential
effects of tradable permits and performance standards on high versus low-cost pollution
controllers, Milliman and Prince [1989] consider the effects of different instruments when
market effects are taken into account. Laffont andTirole [1996a, 1996b] explore the use of spot
and futures markets for pollution permits in inducing optimal rates of diffusion and
innovation.
2Nelson et al. [1993] consider the effect of constraints on the use of economic instruments on
capital turnover in the electric power industry. Jaffe and Stavins [1995] estimate the factors
determining adoption of energy-efficient building insulation. Newell et al. [1999] study the
effects of energy prices and government regulation on energy-saving product innovation.
3 See Hannon andMcDowell [1984] and Saloner and Shepard [1995] on adoption of ATMs,
Karshenas and Stoneman [1993] on adoption of computer-assisted machine tools, Stoneman
and Kwon [1994] on the diffusion of multiple process technologies, and Rose and Joskow
[1990] on electrical utility adoption of supercritical coal-fired steam-electric generation.
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performance standard [Malueg 1989]. Plants with relatively low costs of
compliance (i.e., sellers in a permit market) will have greater incentives for
cost-saving technology adoption within a trading regime. At the same time,
relatively high-cost plants (i.e., permit buyers) will have decreased adoption
incentives under the permit system.
The intuitionbehind this latter proposition is illustrated inFigure 1,which
shows themarginal cost of abatement (e.g., lead reduction) for buyers versus
sellers, with and without the adoption of technology that lowers pollution
control costs.4 The price of permits that would exist in a tradable permit
market is given by the dashed horizontal line at p, and the level of pollution
reduction required under an individually-binding performance standard is
given by the dashed vertical line at ‘standard’. The tradable permit system
encourages all plants to take action until their marginal cost of pollutant
reduction equals the permit price, while the individual standard forces all
plants to attain a fixed target.
Under the individual standard, low-cost sellers could save cost area A by
adopting the new technology, while they could gain areas AþB under a
permit market policy. Sellers’ incentives to adopt are therefore higher under
the permit system because they can undertake additional reductions and get
profit area B by selling permits. Relatively high-cost buyers, on the other
hand, would save areas CþD by adopting the new technology under a
uniform standard, while they would save only area C under a permit market
policy. The incentives to adopt would thus be lower for buyers under the
permit system, since they can buy permits rather than being forced to self-
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Figure 1
Adoption Incentives for ‘Sellers’ vs. ‘Buyers’ under Alternative Policies
4 By ‘seller’ (‘buyer’) we mean seller (buyer) both before and after technology adoption. The
case of a buyer before, but a seller after technology adoption leads to an ambiguous effect of
instrument on adoption propensity, while the case of a seller before, but a buyer after
technology adoption does not make economic sense [Malueg 1989].
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comply with relatively expensive reductions. Thus, the tradable permit
system provides incentives for more efficient adoption, but it can lower
adoption incentives for some plants with high compliance costs.5 Under a
nontradable performance standard, such opportunities for flexibility do not
exist to the same degree. If plants face individually binding standards, they
will be forced to take individual action – such as technology adoption –
regardless of the cost, with the resultant inefficiency reflected in a divergence
across plants in the marginal costs of pollution control.
We employ a unique panel dataset on petroleum refineries covering the
full period of theU.S. lead phasedown, which beganwith a requirement that
new cars after 1974 use unleaded gasoline. This was followed by
performance standards on lead in gasoline, a tradable permit market
controlling the lead in leaded gasoline (1983–1987), ending with a more
stringent performance standard and ultimately a ban in 1996. The adoption
of pentane-hexane isomerization technology – a substitute for lead as a
source of octane –was one of themajor responses to the increased severity of
regulation.
We find that increased regulatory stringency (which raised the effective
price of lead) encouraged greater adoption of lead-reducing technology.We
also show that larger and more technically sophisticated refineries were
more likely to adopt the new technology. Importantly, we further find that
the tradable permit systemprovided incentives formore efficient technology
adoption decisions. The relative adoption propensity of refineries with low
versus high compliance costs was significantly greater under the tradable
permit regime than under a nontradable performance standard.
I(i). U.S. Regulation of Lead in Gasoline
Lead was added to gasoline for many decades to raise octane levels cheaply.6
Thedecision to reduce lead ingasoline in theUnitedStates came in response to
twomain factors. First, as is summarized in Table I, the phasedown of lead in
gasoline began in 1974 when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) introduced rules requiring the use of unleaded gasoline in new cars
equipped with catalytic converters. The introduction of catalytic converters
for emissions control required that motorists use unleaded gasoline, because
lead destroys the emissions control capacity of catalytic converters. A large
5Whether any of these policies provide incentives for fully efficient technology adoption
depends on a comparison with the social benefits of technology adoption and the usual
weighing of marginal social costs and benefits.
6Octane is a characteristic of fuel components that improves the performance of engines by
preventing fuel fromcombusting prematurely in the engine. The availability of high-octane fuel
allows more powerful engines to be built. Cars will not operate efficiently with a lower-octane
fuel than that for which they were designed. In addition, some older cars need more than a
minimum level of lead (less than 0.1 grams of lead per gallon) to prevent a problem called valve
seat recession.
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proportionof the eventual phasedownof lead ingasoline is in fact attributable
to thedecreasing share of leaded gasoline that resulted from the transition to a
new car fleet. To help promote the supply of unleaded gasoline, EPA also
scheduled performance standards requiring refineries to decrease the average
lead content of gasoline beginning in 1975, but these were postponed until
1979 through a series of regulatory adjustments.
Second, by the 1980s, studies showed adverse effects of atmospheric lead
on the IQ of children and on hypertension in adults [U.S. EPA 1985]. In
1982, new rules changed the basis of the standard from a refinery
performance standardmeasured in terms of lead content per pooled volume
of leaded plus unleaded gasoline, to a standard that specifically limited the
allowable content of lead in leaded gasoline to a quarterly average of 1.1
grams of lead per gallon (glpg). Very small refineries faced less stringent
standards until 1983. During 1985 the standardwas reduced to 0.5 glpg, and
beginning in 1986 the allowable content of lead in leaded gasoline was
Table I
Federal Standards for LeadPhasedown
Deadline Standard Small Refinery Exceptions
July 4, 1974 Gasoline retailers must offer unleaded
gasoline for use in cars with catalytic
converters.
F
October 1, 1979 Refineries must not produce gasoline
averaging more than 0.5 glpg per
quarter, pooled (leaded and
unleaded).
Small refineries (r50,000 bpd crude
oil capacity, owned by company with
r137,500 bpd capacity) are subject to
less stringent standard of 0.8–2.65
glpg varying by capacity.
November 1, 1982 Refineries must meet a leaded gas
standard of 1.1. Interrefinery
averaging of lead rights is permitted
among large refineries and among
small refineries, but not between
refineries of different sizes.
Very small refineries (r10,000 bpd
gasoline production, owned by
company withr70,000 bpd
production) are subject to a less
stringent pooled standard of 2.16 or
2.65 varying by capacity.
July 1, 1983 Very small refineries are also subject to
a standard of 1.1 (leaded). Averaging
is permitted among all refineries.
F
January 1, 1985 During 1985 only, refineries are
permitted to ‘bank’ excess lead rights
for use in a subsequent quarter.
F
July 1, 1985 The standard is reduced to 0.5
(leaded).
F
January 1, 1986 The standard is reduced to 0.1
(leaded).
F
January 1, 1988 Interrefinery averaging and
withdrawal of banked lead usage
rights are no longer permitted. Each
refinery must comply with the 0.1
standard.
F
January 1, 1996 Lead additives in motor vehicle
gasoline are prohibited.
F
Source: United States Code of Federal Regulations [1996].
Note: glpg5 grams of lead per gallon; bpd5 barrels per day.
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reduced to its final level of 0.1 glpg. Leadwas banned as a fuel additive in the
United States beginning in 1996.
To ease the transition for refineries, the regulations permitted both
trading and banking of lead permits through a system of ‘inter-refinery
averaging.’ Trading of lead permits among refineries was allowed from late
1982 through the end of 1987. Banking was allowed during 1985–1987.
Beginning in 1988, EPA reimposed a performance standard of 0.1 glpg
applicable to individual refineries. See Hahn and Hester [1989] and Nichols
[1997] for a general overview of trading behavior and other aspects of the
lead trading program. The estimated cost to the refining industry of
complying with lead regulations in 1988 alone was about $500 million
[Nichols 1997]; total costs were in the billions of dollars.
Before late 1979 and from late 1982 through the end of 1987, refineries had
extensive flexibility in their response to the lead regulations. They could
choose how much unleaded gasoline to produce and could purchase lead
permits to maintain a high level of lead in leaded gasoline if they chose. We
characterize the form of regulation during these periods as an economic
instrument. In contrast, from late 1979 through late 1982 and after 1987,
each refinery faced an individual performance standard.We characterize the
form of regulation in these periods as a performance standard.
For a given demand for octane in gasoline, a constraint on the amount of
lead that can be used to boost octane will increase the demand for more
expensive substitute sources of octane. At the aggregate level there are two
basic approaches to reducing the need for lead. One is the use of other
octane-enhancing additives, such as MTBE (methyl tertiary-butyl ether).
These are more expensive than lead and only a part of the long-term
solution. Another approach, on which we focus, is to increase refineries’
abilities to produce high-octane gasoline components. In the short run,
existing equipment can be run more intensively to increase octane
production, but eventually new investment is required. At an individual
level, a refinery can also adjust by altering the type of crude oil it purchases,
by buying intermediate products with higher octane content, or by changing
its output mix to one requiring less octane.
Pentane-hexane isomerization (henceforth referred to simply as isomer-
ization) is one technology that can be used to replace octane lost when lead
usage is reduced. Isomerizationwas a new technology in the early 1970s, but
by 1985–1988, investments in isomerization were projected to provide
around 40% of additional octane requirements.7 Isomerization can be used
in a refinery of any size and complexity and can be installed at any time in an
7Additives including MTBE provided about one third, and alkylation, catalytic cracking,
and reforming together provided most of the remaining increase. Prior to 1986, isomerization
played a smaller role in octane production, and increased severity of reforming and fluid
catalytic cracking provided much of the octane increases [Oil and Gas Journal 1986].
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existing refinery.8 In 1986, the minimum investment required for a 5,000-
barrel-per-day unit was around $2.6 million [Oil and Gas Journal, 1986],
which is a relatively small investment in the refining industry. Because the
primary purpose of isomerization is to increase gasoline octane, the
specialization of the technology makes it ideal for assessing the impact of
lead regulation on technology adoption.9
In Section 2 we develop an analytical and econometric model of the
incentives to adopt technology as a function of economic and regulatory
variables and individual characteristics. Section 3 describes our data and the
results of our empirical application using a panel of 378 refineries from 1971
to 1995. We conclude in Section 4.
II. TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION IN RESPONSE TO REGULATION
II(i). AModel of the Technology Adoption Decision
Weconsider a situationwhere a new technology is available to each refinery i at
a cost C(Zit,t) at time t where Zit is a vector of refinery-specific characteristics
thatmayaffect the cost of adoption.We treat theadoptiondecisionas adiscrete
choice, which is reasonable for the case at hand.10 We define P0 as the profit
without isomerization andP1 as the profit after adoption (gross of the cost of
adoption).Each refinerymaximizesprofits andchoosesT, the timeofadoption,
to solve the following dynamic optimization problem:
ð1Þ max
T
Z T
0
P0ðZit;Rit;Kt; tÞertdt CðZiT ;TÞerT
þ
Z 1
T
P1ðZit;Rit;Kt; tÞertdt;
8Many new technologiesmust be adoptedwhen other changes are beingmade to the existing
plant or when old technology is replaced. Rose and Joskow [1990] show how to control for this
situation econometrically. This is not the case for isomerization.
9Unlike some other refining technologies, isomerization was relatively unaffected by the
othermajor changes in the refinery industry during the 1980s because of its low level of previous
adoption. The two other technologies that were key in replacing lead in gasoline were catalytic
reforming and alkylation. The industry had large amounts of these technologies before the lead
phasedown began because these technologies produce intermediate inputs used in the
production of a wide range of outputs. The most important change in the industry during this
period is the removal, in 1981, of price and allocation controls on crude oil, which had
effectively subsidized the crude oil used by smaller refineries [Energy Information
Administration 1993]. After 1981, many small refineries closed and larger refineries took over
their supply of gasoline. Refinery technologies such as catalytic reforming and alkylation were
rationalized in response to this restructuring. Whereas a change in the level of either of these
technologies could be interpreted as a response to many factors other than the regulation of
lead, a change in the level of isomerization can be interpreted primarily as a response to the
phaseout of lead from gasoline.
10 Isomerization capacity in our data was always added as a discrete, one-time, investment.
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where the set of refinery-specific characteristicsZit also affects profits,Kt is the
stock of capacity of the new technology already installed in the industry, Rit
represents the stringency and form of regulation faced by each refinery11, and r
is the discount rate. The variables Zit, Rit, and Kt can change over time.
A refinery will adopt at the first time T where the investment is profitable
as long as it is not evenmore profitable to wait until a later period because of
falling investment costs. The first order condition fromEquation 1 is known
as the arbitrage condition:
ð2Þ VðZiT ;RiT ;KT ;TÞ  rCðZiT ;TÞ þ qCðZiT ;TÞqt  0;
where VðZiT ;RiT ;KT ;TÞ ¼ P1ðZiT ;RiT ;KT ;TÞ P0ðZiT ;RiT ;KT ;TÞ is
the gross value of the adopted technology at timeT. The arbitrage condition
is a sufficient condition if the adoption cost is nonincreasing and convex, and
the gross value of adoption, V, is nondecreasing with respect to time.12 We
also note that in order for adoption to take place in finite time, these
conditions together imply that adoption must be profitable:Z 1
T
VðZit;Rit;Kt; tÞertdt CðZiT ;TÞerT40:
The gross value of adoption varies across refineries, as does the cost and
the change in cost over time. Refineries with the highest value will tend to
adopt first; then, as the costs of technology adoption fall or its benefits rise
(e.g., because of increased regulatory stringency), other refineries begin to
adopt. This is known as the rank effect because refineries are ranked by the
profitability of the new technology [Karshenas and Stoneman 1995]. The
gradual sweeping across this distribution of values tends to produce the
S-shaped pattern that is typically found for the diffusion of new technologies
(assuming a single-peaked distribution).A second important effect is known
as the stock effect.As more refineries adopt the technology and the stock of
installed capacity rises, the supply of high-octane intermediate products will
11 There is some ambiguity with the definition of Rit when there is advanced knowledge of
future regulatory stringency – as when announced regulatory deadlines include significant lead
time – and/or lags in the technology adoption process, due for example to construction
timeframes.We donot, however, feel this is a serious problem in the particular casewe examine
empirically. Refineries generally faced little if any incentive to reduce lead usage before they
were required to, and the time given to them from regulatory announcement to compliance
deadline was adequate relative to the time required for technology installation. As described
below, the pattern of adoption corresponds closelywith the trajectory of compliance deadlines.
12 Specifically, the second-order condition that is sufficient if it holds everywhere is:
qVðZit;Rit;Kt; tÞ=qt rqCðZit; tÞ=qtþ q2CðZit; tÞ=qt2  0:
These conditions are likely to hold over our period of analysis because regulatory stringency
was increasing and because adoption costs generally fell at a decreasing rate over time,
eventually tending to a constant level; the general pattern is convex.
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rise and the price of octane will fall, as will the return to adoption. We allow
for each of these effects within our econometric model.13
In addition to the above representation of adoption behavior, which
models adoption as the result of value-maximizing decisions by hetero-
geneous adopters, the literature on technology diffusion has traditionally
emphasized the role played by the gradual dissemination of information
about a new technology. Adopting technology can be a risky undertaking
requiring considerable information. It takes time for information to diffuse
sufficiently, and the diffusion of technology is limited by this diffusion of
information. In the epidemic model of technology diffusion [Griliches 1957;
Stoneman 1983], this process is represented in amanner similar to the spread
of a disease, with adoption rates depending on the interaction between
adopters and potential adopters. The presumption is that one of the most
important sources of information about a new technology is firms that have
already adopted. Under typical assumptions, the epidemicmodel also yields
the characteristic S-shaped diffusion pattern. As described below, within the
duration framework used in our econometric analysis, this information
dissemination process can be represented through the baseline hazard
function, and its importance ascertained by assessing the degree of duration
dependence of the baseline hazard.
II(ii). Econometric Model of the Timing of Technology Adoption
Econometric modeling of technology adoption decisions lends itself
naturally to the use of statistical techniques developed for analysis of
duration data. Duration data describe processes and events where it is
typically not only the duration of the process per se that is interesting, but
also the likelihood that the event will now occur, given that the process has
lasted as long as it has. Duration models were originally developed in
13 Sometimes so-called order effects are distinguished from the closely related stock effects
concept, but with an emphasis on the strategic behavior of firms that could arise when earlier
adopters achieve greater returns than later adopters. In the game-theoretic approach of
Fudenberg and Tirole [1985], this strategic behavior results in a race to be high in the order of
adoption due to first-mover advantages through which preemptive early adoption influences
the timing of later adoption. While a decline in the value of adoption as a function of the
magnitude of previous adoption can theoretically occur with or without any strategic behavior
[Quirmbach 1986], distinguishing empirically between these is extremely difficult if not
impossible with available data (see, for example,Karshenas andStoneman [1993]). In addition,
although not clearly addressed in the relevant theoretical literature, the effectiveness of any
strategic behavior presumably would decline as the number of firms gets large. With markets
for both refinery outputs and inputs typically involving many firms at a regional or national
level, we think it is unlikely that strategically motivated technology adoption behavior would
be very prevalent or have much influence on our results. The variable STOCK, which is a
national aggregate, therefore seems unlikely to be picking up any strategic effects. To the extent
higher regional concentration of refineries is associated with earlier adoption by some
refineries, this may be captured as a negative effect of the variableDENSITY, although it is not
clear that the average probability of adoption in a concentrated region would be higher.
POLICY-INDUCED TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 325
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003.
biomedical science to describe such events as the survival times of patients
with heart transplants, and in industrial engineering tomodel such events as
the risk of equipment failure. Within the economics literature, duration
analysis has been applied to labor issues, such as the measurement of
unemployment spells, and to a more limited extent, issues related to
technology adoption [Hannan andMcDowell 1984; Rose and Joskow 1990;
Karshenas and Stoneman 1993; Saloner and Shepard 1995]. Kalbfleisch and
Prentice [1980], Kiefer [1988], and Lancaster [1990] provide introductions to
duration analysis, both in general and in its specific application within
economics.
A duration model of technology adoption is based on formulating the
problem in terms of the conditional probability of adoption at a particular
time, given that adoption has not already occurred and given the
characteristics of the individual and its environment. Note the correspon-
dence between this conceptualization of the problem and the technology
adoption decision as framed in the previous section. In addition to the
intuitive appeal of framing the technology adoption decision in this way,
durationmodels provide a convenient framework for incorporating data on
explanatory variables that change over time (so-called time-varying
covariates) and other elements of the dynamic process of technological
change. Estimating the effect of regulations and other determinants of
technology adoption that change over time (e.g., technology costs, stocks,
epidemic and learning effects) is in fact central to our specific research
interest. After the general structure of the probability model has been
specified, along with some additional functional form and distributional
assumptions, the model can be estimated by maximum-likelihoodmethods.
We therefore proceed by formulating the timing of technology adoption
within a duration model as a function of the explanatory variables that we
found through the arbitrage condition (Equation 2) to be fundamental to
this decision. Specifically, the rate at which individuals will adopt the
technology in period t, conditional on having not adopted before t, is known
as the ‘hazard rate’ at time t. The hazard function for each individual is
denoted h(t, Xit, h) and it is given by the conditional probability
hðt;Xit; hÞ ¼ f ðt;Xit; hÞ
1 Fðt;Xit; hÞ ;
where F(t,Xit, h)5Pr(Tot) is the cumulative distribution function specify-
ing the probability that the random variable T (i.e., time until adoption) is
less than some value t, f(t,Xit, h)5 dF(t,Xit, h)/dt is its density function,Xit is
a set of explanatory variableswhichmay change over time, (e.g., the superset
of Zit, Rit, and Kt from above), and h is a set of parameters to be estimated.
The behavior of the hazard function over time depends on the distributional
assumption for F(t,Xit, h) and on the way that the explanatory variables Xit
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change over time. Estimation of the parameters h can proceed using
maximum likelihood.
We place further structure on the hazard function by means of a
convenient and widely used approach in which the hazard function (and
parameter set h) is factored into two parts. One part is the baseline hazard,
h0(t), which may depend on time but not on the other explanatory variables.
The baseline hazard captures any effects on duration that are not
represented by the other explanatory variables included in the analysis; it
is assumed to be common to all individuals. In the context of technology
adoption, the baseline hazard captures possible epidemic effects described
above.
The second part of the factored hazardmodel depends on the explanatory
variables Xit and associated parameter vector b in an exponential manner,
which both permits straightforward estimation and inference and ensures
that the hazard is positive without additional restrictions. The hazard
function becomes
ð3Þ hðt;Xit; bÞ ¼ h0ðtÞ expðX0itbÞ:
An estimated parameter b is interpretable as the effect on the log hazard rate
of a unit change in an explanatory variable at time t. If the explanatory
variables are normalized to equal zero at some sensible reference case
(e.g., the variable means), then h0(t) is interpretable as the hazard function
for the reference case, and exp(b) 1 gives the percentage effect of the
explanatory variable on the hazard rate relative to the reference case. We
employ this type of normalization in our empirical application, as explained
below.
Estimation of the hazard model through maximum-likelihood methods
(based onEquation 3) can proceed either in a completely parametric fashion
by choosing h0(t) from a parametric family, or by using the Cox [1975]
partial-likelihood approach, which does not require specifying the form of
h0. A variety of alternative parametric functions have been used for the first
approach. The most widely used is an exponential distribution of duration
times (i.e., F(t)5 1 exp( gt) and f(t)5 g exp( gt)), which leads to a
constant baseline hazard h0(t)5 g. Coupled with specification tests, its
simplicity and ease of interpretation make the exponential distribution a
natural point of departure for analysis.
We also estimate models using the Weibull, Gompertz, and gamma
distributions, which allow for nonconstant baseline hazards (i.e., duration
dependence) and include the exponential distribution as a special case,
thereby enabling specification testing. If, for example, as described above,
uncertainty about the value of isomerization falls in unobservable ways over
time as adoption spreads and learning occurs through an epidemic effect, we
might expect that the hazard rate would rise over time.Nonetheless, because
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we control formany of the variables that are thought to govern the timing of
technology adoption, it should not be surprising if the remaining baseline
hazard is essentially constant.14 To further check the appropriateness of our
parametric form of the hazard model, we also estimate the Cox partial-
likelihood model.
III. ESTIMATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION DECISION
III(i). Explanatory Variables
Using information from the Department of Energy, trade journals, EPA,
and individual oil companies, we compiled a 5,647-observation database of
the annual technical and operating characteristics of 378 refineries spanning
the 25-year period 1971–1995. These data cover virtually the entire
population of U.S. refineries over a period that predates the first recorded
adoption of isomerization in the United States, in 1972. We coupled these
data with information on lead regulations, technology costs, the lead-
trading behavior of individual refineries, and other relevant economic and
refinery market variables.15 The sources, definitions, and construction of
individual variables are further described below; basic descriptive statistics
of each of the variables are given in Table II. To facilitate interpretation of
estimated parameters, we normalized continuous variables so that a unit
change in each transformed variable represents a 10% change from its mean
value, or in the case of our regulatory stringency variable (REGULATE), a
10% change in the level of stringency.16
14Unobserved heterogeneity in individual characteristics raises additional issues specific to
duration analysis. In particular, if individuals have differing duration distributions after
controlling for included explanatory variables, this can result in a downward bias in estimated
duration dependence [Kiefer 1988]. Intuitively, as time passes those individuals remaining will
tend tohave lower hazard rates, and thiswill showupas a decline in the hazard function relative
to its true value. We test for the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in our sample by
introducing it parametrically as an unobserved multiplicative effect on the hazard function
[Hougaard 1986]. We assess two possible distributions for the unobserved heterogeneity, the
Gamma distribution and the Inverse-Gaussian distribution. Likelihood ratio tests did not
support the presence of either form of unobserved heterogeneity.
15 In addition to the variables described below, we also tested the effect of the price of crude
oil to refiners [Energy Information Administration, 2000], but found that its effect was very
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. The price of crude oil could in theory
influence the adoption decision both due to its effect on overall refining costs and profits, and
because the price of MTBE (an important substitute for lead and isomerization) tends to be
closely associated with the price of crude oil [U.S. International Trade Commission, 1999]. An
adequate time series of the price of MTBE was not directly available because MTBE was not
produced in the U.S. until 1979 and price data is not available until many years later.
16We accomplished this by first dividing each variable by its mean, then multiplying by 10,
and finally taking deviations fromeachmean (by subtracting 10), resulting in ameanof zero for
the transformed variables. We normalizedREGULATE by dividing by its maximum and then
multiplying by 10, so that it equals zero at its minimum and 10 at its maximum.
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Refinery characteristics
We expect certain characteristics of individual refineries to raise or lower the
net value of isomerization and thus raise or lower a refinery’s propensity to
adopt this new technology. Data on the technical and operating
characteristics for refineries come from annual issues of the Petroleum
Supply Annual [Energy Information Administration 1980–1995] and theOil
and Gas Journal [1971–1979]. These sources and information from the
American Petroleum Institute [1996] were used to assign refineries to
companies and to verify the years in which the refineries were in operation.
Dependent variable – presence of isomerization. The dependent variable is
whether a refinery has adopted isomerization at each point in timewithin the
sample. Capacity information is recorded as of January 1 each year, so a
refinery is treated as having adopted isomerization at the start of 1986 if it
had no such capacity at the beginning of 1985 but did so as of the start of
1986. If the refinery had not adopted by 1995 or the refinery shut down, the
observation is treated as censored in that year. Figure 2 shows the
cumulative adoption of isomerization over the period of interest. Adoption
Table II
VariableDefinitions andDescriptive Statistics
Variable Name Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Dependent Variable
Isomerization indicator F 0.09 0.28 0 1
Refinery Characteristics
Refinery size (kb/cd) REFSIZE 67.11 85.75 0.05 640
Company size (kb/cd) COSIZE 356.27 440.52 0.05 1841
Large refinery indicator LARGE 0.40 0.49 0 1
Catalytic reforming indicator COMPLEX 0.71 0.45 0 1
Regulatory Variables
Leaded gas standard (glpg) L 1.71 1.31 0.10 3.00
Percent share of leaded gasoline
consumption in region
S 0.53 0.32 0 0.96
Regulatory stringency REGULATE 2.16 1.45 0.15 4.09
Economic instrument indicator ECON 0.56 0.50 0 1
Predicted value from seller probit SELLER 0.47 0.24 0.02 0.95
Market Variables
National isomerization capacity
(kb/sd)
STOCK 147.71 142.90 0.00 406.95
Number of refineries in region DENSITY 31.24 12.41 4 61
Discount rate R 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.09
Cost of isomerization ($1995/b/sd) COST 608.16 48.60 554.22 767.11
Annualized cost of isomerization
($1995/b/sd)
RCOST 26.16 12.54 0.62 55.00
Rate of change in cost of
isomerization
DCOSTDT  0.01 0.03  0.12 0.01
Note: Descriptive statistics are for untransformed data; see the text for a description of how we transformed the
data for estimation. kb/cd5 thousand barrels of capacity per calendar day; kb/sd5 thousand barrels of capacity
per stream day; g/lg5 grams per leaded gallon. The number of observations for the full sample isN5 5647.
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is slow in the 1970s, but increases around 1980 under the individually
binding lead performance standard, and then againmore dramatically in the
mid to late 1980s as the standards became more stringent and then
individually binding again. The annual count of adoptions ranges from 0 to
10 annually.
Size and industry setting. Theoretical and empirical work on technology
diffusion suggests that size (e.g., of establishments, firms, plants) may play
an important role in adoption decisions, perhaps as a proxy for such factors
as economies of scale, risk aversion, investment hurdle rates, management
quality, or participation in research and development activities. The
empirical literature generally finds that smaller entities adopt new
technologies more slowly.17 For the specific case at hand, the trade press
suggests that small refineries generally have higher costs of adopting
isomerization [Oil andGas Journal 1967].We employ two indicators of size –
the size of each refinery and the size of the company that owns it. Refinery
size (REFSIZE) is defined as its operating crude distillation capacity in
thousand barrels per calendar day (kb/cd). One of the categorical variables
used in our test of regulatory form, LARGE, is that refinery capacity be
greater than 50 kb/cd, the standard industry definition of a larger
refinery. The expected effect of company size on isomerization adoption
is more ambiguous. Adoption may be less likely at refineries in larger
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Year
C
um
ul
at
iv
e N
um
be
r o
f A
do
pt
io
ns
Figure 2
Cumulative Adoption of Isomerization
17Karshenas and Stoneman [1995] and Geroski [2000] provide surveys, and Levin et al.
[1987], Rose and Joskow [1990], Karshenas and Stoneman [1993], and Saloner and Shepard
[1995] provide specific evidence of a positive effect of size on adoption propensity. Oster [1982]
is one of the few studies finding a negative effect of firm size on adoption, attributing the large
U.S. steel firms’ ‘technologically laggard’ behavior to their insulation from competition.
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companies because these refineries tend to have better access to high-octane
intermediate products from affiliated refineries and may have greater
flexibility in their output choice because other affiliated refineries supply
parts of their market. They may also face higher bureaucratic barriers to
adoption if decisions are not allmade at the refinery level. On the other hand,
adoption may be more likely at refineries within larger companies if larger
companies have greater access to capital and to the skills, knowledge, and
information from affiliated refineries that lower the cost of adoption. We
define the size of the company that owns each refinery (COSIZE) as the sum
of operating crude capacity (kb/cd) in all affiliated refineries. We also
include the variable DENSITY, which measures the number of refineries in
each region. We expect that refineries in regions with a greater number of
other refineries will have greater access to intermediate products and greater
output flexibility, and may thus have lower adoption propensities. On the
other hand, if refineries learn about new technologies from geographically
proximate refineries, increased refinery density could have a positive affect
on adoption. The geographic distribution of refineries across the United
States is illustrated in Figure 3. Regions in our analysis are based on
Department of Energy definitions.18
Technological sophistication. The variable COMPLEX is a categorical
variable indicating that a refinery had catalytic reforming capacity, a
technology that distinguishes simple from more complex refineries.19 One
option for installing isomerization is to adapt an existing catalytic reforming
unit; refineries without this option face higher adoption costs. We also
expect that simple refineries may have less knowledge of the technology or
face greater uncertainty about its value. These higher costs of adoption for
simple refineries should tend to lower their relative adoption propensity,
particularly when regulation allows such flexibility.
Technology cost and stock
Cost of isomerization. Both theory and common sense suggest that the
cost of a technology is an important determinant of whether andwhen it will
be adopted. We gathered typical costs of construction for an isomerization
18The 10 regional definitions we use are from the Department of Energy’s Refinery
Evaluation Modeling System. These regions were developed to provide a reasonable
geographic aggregation for petroleum refining modeling purposes, and are derived from a
combination of 13 Bureau of Mines districts with five Petroleum Administration for Defense
(PAD) districts. The additional inclusion of regional dummies in the model did not add
significant explanatory power.
19Alkylation capacity also tends to be present at more sophisticated refineries. We do not
include this variable in the final results, however, because we found that it had a small and
statistically insignificant independent effect.
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unit from the trade journal Hydrocarbon Processing [1966–1994]. We
deflated these costs into constant dollars using the Nelson Refinery Cost
Index [American Petroleum Institute 1998] and then normalized the cost to
equal one in 1971, resulting in the variable COST. 20As illustrated in Figure
4, the real costs of isomerization dropped by about 30 percent over the
period of analysis, to about $5.5 million for a 10,000-barrel-per-stream-day
unit in 1995.AlthoughCOST is purely a time-series variable,we also capture
cross-sectional differences in adoption costs through the variables for size
(REFSIZE) and technological sophistication (COMPLEX).
Stock of isomerization capacity. As more refineries adopt isomerization,
they increase the supply of high-octane intermediate outputs, hence
lowering the price differential between leaded and unleaded gasoline and
themarginal value of octane. This should lower adoption propensities as the
installed stock of isomerization increases. On the other hand, if the installed
Examples of number of refineries
43
22
4
Figure 3
Geographic Density of Refineries (average number by state).
Note that the size of the circles is proportional to the number of refineries.
20Wealso created twoother cost variables suggested by theory:RCOST, which is annualized
cost where the discount rate is the Moody’s AAA corporate bond rate from the Economic
Report of the President [Council of Economic Advisors 1997], and DCOSTDT, which is the
percentage annual change in the cost of isomerization. Neither of these variables added any
explanatory power to the model once the more basic measure of cost was included.
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stock of isomerization acts as a proxy for cumulative experience with this
technology, the learning and reduced uncertainty associated with it could
have a positive effect on adoption. Our STOCK variable is defined as the
total industry isomerization capacity in thousand barrels per stream day
(kb/sd), lagged one period to avoid an endogeneity problem.
Regulatory variables
See Table I for a summary of the federal lead regulations that form the basis
for our construction of the regulatory variables. We explore two types of
regulatory variables that capture the effects of both the stringency and the
form of regulation (i.e., performance standard or economic instrument).
Regulatory stringency. The overall stringency of lead regulations is
inversely related to the average amount of lead allowed per gallon, which
depends on the stringency of the standard for leaded gasoline and on the
share of leaded gasoline in total gasoline. As the allowable level of lead in
leaded gasoline decreases, and the share of leaded gasoline decreases as post-
1974 unleaded-only cars replace older ones, effective stringency will
increase. Increased regulatory stringency should increase the propensity to
adopt isomerization because isomerization is a substitute for lead in octane
production. Because octane responds in an approximately log-linear
manner to the addition of lead [Leffler 1985], this suggests the following
definition for our regulatory stringency variable (REGULATE):
REGULATEit ¼ Sit ln B=Lit
 þ 1 Sitð Þ ln B=Uð Þ;
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where S is the share of leaded gasoline consumption, B is the baseline
unregulated level of lead per gallon,L is allowable content of lead per leaded
gallon, 1S is the share of unleaded gasoline consumption, and U is the
(very low) content of lead per unleaded gallon. L, S, and thus REGULATE
vary across refineries and over time.
The share of leaded gasoline consumed, S, varies by location and over
time from 1 in 1970 to 0 in 1995. We construct S using state-level data based
on the Petroleum Marketing Monthly [Energy Information Administration
1983–1992], a study by Ethyl Corporation,21 and the U.S. Statistical
Abstract [U.S. Bureau of the Census 1971–1995]. We then aggregate values
to the regional level using the ten regional definitions described earlier.
Federal regulations define unleaded gasoline as having a lead level of 0.05
grams of lead per gallon or less (U5 0.05). In 1970, leaded gasoline had a
pre-regulation baseline lead level of approximately B5 3 grams of lead per
gallon [U.S. Department of Energy 1986]. REGULATE thus varies from 0
in 1970 to a maximum of 4 by 1995, when leaded gasoline was virtually
eliminated (i.e., REGULATEmax5 ln(B/U)5 ln(3/.05)5 4.09 prior to our
normalization). Beginning in 1979, lead in leaded gasoline was restricted to a
levelL, whichwas initially the pooled gas standard divided by the leaded gas
share and then the leaded standard from November 1982 on (see Table I).
Small refineries were treated differently from 1979 until July 1983, and this is
also incorporated in our measure of L (See Table I). L is prorated when
regulations span partial years.
Regulatory form. With our regulatory form variable we seek to test the
hypothesis that firms with relatively low (high) costs of individual
compliance (e.g., ‘sellers’ versus ‘buyers’ in tradable permit markets) face
higher (lower) incentives to adopt under an economic incentive – based
instrument than under an individually binding performance standard.
Ideally, we would like to observe whether a refinery’s marginal cost of
compliance if it acts alone is above or below the market price determined by
the economic instrument. If a refinery’s marginal costs are below themarket
permit price, it would face higher returns to adoption when the economic
instrument is employed. If a refinery’s marginal costs are above the permit
price, it would face higher returns to adoption under an individually binding
performance standard.
Because we have neither individual compliance costs nor the permit price
over time, we approach this question in two alternative ways. We begin by
defining the variable ECON to indicate periods during which, at year end,
refineries had flexibility in their individual lead use (i.e., 1971–1978 and
1982–1986) versus periods when they were subject to individually binding
21 These data for 1980–1982 were kindly provided by Severin Borenstein.
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performance standards (i.e., 1979–1981 and 1987–1995). We then interact
this regulatory form variable with indicators of individual refinery
compliance costs. These interactions take two forms. In the first model,
we simply interact ECON with two indicators of low compliance
cost, LARGE and COMPLEX.22 We include ECON and these interaction
terms in the duration model along with the other variables described
above.23
In the second model, we employ a two-stage procedure. First, we take the
intermediate step of creating a variable SELLER, which represents the
expected probability that a refinery is a seller of permits, indicating it has
relatively low compliance costs. Second, we interact SELLER with ECON
as in the first model and include it in the main equation. To construct the
variable SELLER, we use data on lead-trading activity that was generated
by the self-reporting requirements of the EPA lead-trading program.24 For
each refinery, we compute the net purchases or sales of lead permits in 1983,
the first full year of operation of the trading program.25We then construct a
discrete variable indicating whether a refinery was a net seller or buyer of
permits, and we estimate a probit model of this variable with relevant
explanatory variables that may affect compliance costs. The results are
shown in Table III; most of the variables have the expected sign. Finally, we
compute the predicted values from this probit equation for the entire sample
– this is the variable SELLER that we use in our duration analysis. One way
22Kerr andMare´ [1999] suggest that small refineries had higher transaction costs in the lead
permitmarket. Thus, because small refineries also tend to have higher adoption costs, although
theymight have wanted to defer adoption by buying permits, they faced relatively high costs of
doing so. Therefore, their propensity to adopt may have fallen less than expected under the
permitmarket. This could reduce the size of the estimated negative effect onECON; accounting
for such an effect would strengthen our results.
23 If LARGE or SELLER (see below) are included as separate (not interacted) explanatory
variables in the estimation, their coefficients are small and statistically insignificant and their
inclusion does not qualitatively alter the results. Furthermore, including these variables
independently would confuse the interpretation of the other size and cost variables already
included in the equation, without providing further explanatory power.
24 The data were collected confidentially by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency via
Form 40-CFR80.20, including information on each refinery’s production of leaded and
unleaded gasoline, as well as the number of permits bought, sold, and banked each quarter
from 1983 through 1987.We have these data for a subset of oil companies, including data both
on those directly observed and on their trading partners. We observe full trading behavior for
only 77 refineries but with their trading partners included, we have a total of 114 observations.
Although we do not observe complete trading for their trading partners, we assume that their
observed direction of trade is an unbiased proxy for the direction of their total net trade. This is
not an unreasonable assumption, since most refineries make only one trade per quarter, or
around four per year. Our fully observed sample accounts for 61% of sales and 49% of
purchases by refineries.Weobserve 48%of all trades.One concernwe hadwas that theremight
be a sample selection problemwith regard to the refineries for which we observed trading data.
However, a Heckman test rejected any sample selection problem.
25We chose 1983 rather than another time period to avoid complications from the allowance
of permit banking in later years.
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to think about the variable SELLER is as a summary measure of relative
compliance costs across refineries, basedon the relationship between the role
of the refinery in the larger market (i.e., seller versus buyer) and the many
variables we have that are indicators of compliance costs. This is precisely
the type of variable we need to test our regulatory form hypothesis. Thus,
the two models we estimate are based on Equation 3, where:
ð4Þ
X0itb ¼b0 þ b1REGULATEit þ b2ECONt þ b3ECONt
LARGEit þ b4ECONtCOMPLEXit
þ b5STOCKt þ b6COSTt þ b7REFSIZEit
þ b8COSIZEit þ b9COMPLEXit þ b10DENSITYit;
and
ð5Þ
X0itb ¼g0 þ g1REGULATEit þ g2ECONt þ g3ECONt
SELLERit
þ g4STOCKt þ g5COSTt þ g6REFSIZEit
þ g7COSIZEit þ g8COMPLEXit þ g9DENSITYit;
Table III
Influence ofRefinery Characteristics on
LeadPermit Selling
Variable Probit model results
LARGE 0.69
(0.33)
COMPLEX 1.42
(0.65)
REFSIZE  0.03
(0.01)
COSIZE 0.01
(0.01)
DENSITY 0.07
(0.03)
Constant  1.38
(0.62)
Log likelihood  69
Observations 114
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at various levels:
5 95%,
5 99%. Dependent variable indicates whether the refinery was
observed to be a net seller of lead permits in 1983, the first year of
trading. Variables are described in more detail in Table II and in
the text. Estimation method is probit maximum likelihood.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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where thebs and gs are parameters to be estimated and subscripting indicates
whether variables vary by refinery i or only time t. For simplicity we have
omitted subscripting from the text. WhileREFSIZE,COSIZE,DENSITY,
COMPLEX, LARGE, and SELLER vary primarily along the cross-section
and REGULATE varies primarily along the time-series dimension,
each of these variables has non-neglible variation along the other dimension
as well.
III(ii). Estimation Results
Asdescribed above, we estimate a durationmodel of the influence of refinery
characteristics, market factors, and regulations on the timing of technology
Table IV
TechnologyAdoptionResponse toRegulatoryandMarketVariables
Model 1 (with indicators
of low cost)
Model 2 (with probability of
being a SELLER)
REGULATE 0.33 0.35
(0.11) (0.10)
ECON  14.02  3.39
(0.73) (1.33)
ECONLARGE 1.83 F
(0.78)
ECONCOMPLEX 11.67 F
(1.01)
ECONSELLER F 4.25
(2.08)
STOCK  0.08  0.09
(0.03) (0.03)
COST  0.26  0.29
(0.56) (0.53)
REFSIZE 0.04 0.05
(0.01) (0.01)
COSIZE  0.06  0.07
(0.02) (0.02)
COMPLEX 1.95 1.77
(0.75) (0.76)
DENSITY  0.16  0.19
(0.04) (0.04)
Constant  7.97  8.10
(0.91) (0.90)
Log likelihood  109  111
Observations 5,141 5,141
Refineries 378 378
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at various levels:
5 95%,
5 99%. Dependent variable indicates whether refinery has adopted isomerization capacity; a total of 63
refineries had adopted isomerization within the sample time frame. Variables are described in more detail in
Table II and in the text. Estimation method is maximum likelihood. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Percentage effects of a unit change in a variable on thehazard rate are equal to exp(b) 1,whereb is
the parameter estimate. Given our normalization of the data, a unit change in a continuous variable is equal to
about a 10% change from its mean, or a 10% increase in the level of REGULATE.
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adoption using maximum-likelihood estimation.26 The results for estima-
tion of Equations 4 and 5 are given in Table IV. The parameter estimates
changed very little undermore flexible distributional assumptions, including
the Cox partial-likelihood approach, which leaves the baseline hazard
function unspecified.27 Moreover, tests of the exponential distribution
relative to more flexible parametric distributions in which it is nested do not
reject the exponential distribution. In addition, we were concerned that
refineries that exit might also be less likely to adopt because they may have
less to gain or have other unobserved characteristics that influence adoption
(e.g., low productivity).We therefore exploredwhether refinery exit or entry
had a significant additional influence on adoption behavior – we found that
it did not.28 Finally, further specification checks found that our use of the
standard hazard model was appropriate, the functional forms for our
explanatory variables were adequate, and the model fit the data reasonably
well.29 We therefore focus our attention on the results in Table IV, which
assumes an exponentially distributed baseline hazard.
The results showa large, statistically significantpositive influenceof increased
regulatory stringencyon isomerizationadoption.The estimateonREGULATE
indicates that a 10% increase in the stringency of gasoline lead regulations was
associatedwith about a 40% increase in probability of new adoptions by refine-
ries. In fact, themagnitude of this effect suggests that virtually all isomerization
adoptionover thisperiod canbeexplainedby the increasedoctane requirements
necessitated by the lead regulations on fuel additives and the car fleet.
26 Because observations in our dataset represent repeated observations on the same subjects
(i.e., individual refineries), the usual assumption of independent observations is questionable.
We therefore use a robust (Huber-White) estimate of the variance-covariance matrix for the
standard errors of our parameter estimates, which relaxes the independence assumption
and requires observations to be independent only across refineries.
27Kerr and Newell [2000] provides results for different distributional assumptions
for the baseline hazard function, demonstrating the robustness of the results to various
distributional assumptions and suggesting that the use of an exponential baseline hazard
function is appropriate in this case.
28 First, we included in the duration models a variable indicating whether a refinery shut
down during the sample period. The estimated sign on this variable was negative, as one might
expect, but it was statistically insignificant and did not significantly alter the other results.
Second, we included a continuous variable representing the time of exit, but again the variable
had an insignificant influence on the results. Analogous estimates for late entry also yielded
insignificant effects. Finally, we estimated the models using only the 118 refineries (out of 378)
thatwere in the sample frombeginning to end, omitting any refineries that shut downor entered
late. The estimates supported the same conclusions as the model estimated on the full sample.
29Using a test developed by Grambsch and Therneau [1994], we use Schoenfeld residuals
from the Cox partial likelihood estimates to conduct a joint test of the assumption that the
explanatory variables have constant effects over time; the test did not reject the assumption
(Pðw2ð5Þ41:74Þ ¼ 0:88). We also conducted many visual checks of the residuals from the
estimation, which had the desired properties (see Lancaster [1990]). In addition, we explored
higher-order functions of our continuous variables (which we found to be small and
statistically insignificant), as well as their logarithmic transformations (which did not
qualitatively alter the results).
338 SUZI KERR AND RICHARDG. NEWELL
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003.
The form taken by lead regulations – individually binding performance
standard or market-based regulation – also had a marked influence on the
pattern of technology adoption. As theory suggests, we found a significant
divergence in the adoption behavior of refineries with low versus high
compliance costs.Namely, the positive differential in the adoption propensity
of expected permit sellers (i.e., low-cost refineries) relative to expected permit
buyers (i.e., high-cost refineries) was significantly greater undermarket-based
lead regulation compared to under individually binding performance
standards. High-cost refineries (i.e., small, simple refineries or expected
permit buyers), in particular, were much less likely to adopt under market-
based regulation. This is evident in the parameter estimates for variables
representing low-cost refineries during economic incentive regimes (i.e.,
ECONSELLER, ECONLARGE, and ECONCOMPLEX), which are
significantly positive, versus theparameter estimates forhigh-cost refineries in
the same period (i.e.,ECON ), which are significantly negative.30 Overall, our
results are consistentwith thefinding that the tradable permit systemprovided
more efficient incentives for technology adoption decisions.31
The other explanatory variables generally had effects consistent with
economic expectations. Consistent with most empirical research on
technology adoption, we found that larger refineries had significantly
higher adoption propensities. The parameter estimate for REFSIZE
indicates that a 10% increase from the mean in individual refinery capacity
was associated with a 4% increase in the rate of adoption.32 The influence of
a refinery’s company size (COSIZE), on the other hand, was found to be
negative; a 10% increase in company-wide capacity was associated with a
6% decrease in the rate of adoption. As we described above, this result is
consistent with the tendency for refineries in larger companies to have better
access to octane-supplementing substitutes for isomerization from affiliated
refineries. These factors presumably offset any positive influence that
company size might have had on adoption. Similarly, we found that an
increased concentration of other refineries in the same geographic region
(DENSITY) had a negative effect on isomerization adoption; a 10%
increase in the number of refineries in a region was associated with a 16%
30SELLER is an econometrically generated variable, so while the coefficient estimate on
ECONSELLER is consistent, its standard error may be biased upward or downward
depending on the covariance of the disturbances in the first-step (i.e., probit) and second-step
(i.e., duration) models (see Murphy and Topel [1985] and Pagan [1984]). In any event, the
models yield qualitatively similar conclusions whether they employ the generated variable
SELLER (Model 2) or direct proxies for cost (Model 1).
31 To check that this is not simply showing that large, complex refineries exhibit some form of
durationdependence,wetestedarangeof timebreaks from1983–1990andfoundthat the likelihood
increases monotonically toward the break at the end of 1987 and peaks there. This suggests
that the change in hazard is indeed in response to the change in the form of regulation.
32Note that this hazard rate increases for large refineries when flexible regulations are in
force, as indicated by the coefficient on ECONLARGE.
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decrease in the rate of adoption. As with company size, this result suggests
that refineries in close proximity to other refineries have greater access to
isomerization substitutes, and that any positive geographic spillovers
regarding learning about isomerization were more than offset.
We also found that more technologically complex refineries had
substantially higher adoption propensities, which we would expect because
the variable we used to measure complexity (i.e., catalytic reforming
capability) has a direct effect on the cost of adopting isomerization. We
estimate that complex refineries were six times more likely to adopt than
simple refineries whenever the performance standards were binding, with
this relative likelihood increasing dramatically when flexible regulations
were in force.
Although our direct measure of how the cost of isomerization equipment
evolved over time (COST) was estimated to have a negative relationship
with adoption, the estimated coefficientwas not statistically significant, even
though it was moderately large. The point estimate is that a 10% reduction
in the cost of isomerization was associated with about a 23% increase in the
rate of adoption, although a 95% confidence interval on this estimate does
not exclude zero. Given that the COST variable is highly correlated with
STOCK, and that most of the decline in isomerization costs occurred prior
to the sample period, our inability to precisely estimate its effect is not that
surprising.
Finally, our estimate of the influence of the already-installed stock of
isomerization (STOCK) demonstrates a negative effect on adoption. A 10%
increase in the existing stock of isomerization capacity was associated with
an 8% reduction in the rate of adoption. As discussed earlier, this negative
‘stock effect’ of installed capacity on adoption propensity is consistent with
the prediction that existing investment would decrease the value of further
investment. This effect seems to have dominated any positive influence of
learning from previous installation of the technology.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Theory has long contended that economic instruments for environmental
protection would lead to the cost-effective adoption of new technologies,
thus enhancing dynamic efficiency. Our empirical evidence supports this
hypothesis. With a natural experiment involving a technology intended
almost exclusively to eliminate a pollutant, and a detailed panel of 378
refineries over 25 years, we find evidence of an adoption response to the
stringency and form of regulation in an expected manner. We found a large
positive response of lead-reducing technology adoption to increased
regulatory stringency, as well as a divergence in the behavior of refineries
with different compliance cost characteristics during periods of flexible
market-based lead regulation. The relative adoption propensity of refineries
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with low versus high compliance costs was significantly greater under
market-based lead regulations than under a nontradable performance
standard. Where environmentally appropriate, this suggests that more
flexible regulation can achieve environmental goals while providing
incentives for more efficient technology diffusion.
Consistent with previous literature, we also find that larger refineries
adopt sooner, which is typically attributed to scale economies, lower
investment hurdle rates, management quality, or participation in research
and development activities. On the other hand, refineries that are part of
larger companies or in regions with many other refineries have lower
adoption propensities, likely because the greater flexibility in input and
output choice makes adoption less profitable. Higher levels of previously
installed technology have a dampening effect on adoption, as do higher
technology costs, although the latter effect was not statistically significant –
both of these factors tend to lower the profitability of adoption. Finally, we
find no evidence of an epidemic or learning effect. Once we have controlled
for changes in costs, technology stocks, and other factors, an exponential
specification with a constant baseline hazard fits as well as any other. This
suggests that information disseminationwas probably not a significant issue
for these firms.
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